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Introduction
This paper investigates the disincentive effects of underpayment on individual productivity.
We are interested in the relationship between the effort invested by a worker at the work place and the difference between perceived deserved income and actual income received. Many firms have difficulty in assessing their employees' contribution to total output and profits (Radner 1993) , as a consequence, workers may earn less or more than they think they deserve. Does the payment of workers above or below their perceived marginal revenue product have defined effects on their effort on the job?
The economics literature to date includes a discussion on workers' attempts to influence their employers' promotion review decisions - Milgrom and Robert (1992) define such activities as "influence costs", where through rent-seeking activity individuals earn rents in the form of promotion. Epstein and Spiegel (2001) take an alternative approach. They consider the effect of the difference between perceived income and actual income on influence costs and thus explain why the effect of income inequality on productivity and growth is ambiguous. In this paper we investigate the effect the difference between perceived income and actual income has on the level of effort invested by the worker in productive activities.
We first develop a theoretical framework to analyse this relationship. We consider a two period model. In the first period a worker determines how much effort to invest at the workplace.
In the second period the worker is either promoted (with an associated salary rise) or not. The probability of promotion is a direct function of the effort invested in the first period. The worker, while making his/her decisions regarding the level of effort to invest in the first period takes into account the difference between his/her actual income earned and that which he/she thinks is deserved. As we show, as the difference between the two incomes (the perceived/deserved and the actual) increases, the level of effort invested by the worker may either increase or decrease. In general if the worker believes he/she should be earning more, then the worker is either discouraged and invests less effort or contrarily, is encouraged to increase effort to "prove" to superiors that he/she is worthy of the promotion. We develop conditions under which the workers will increase or decreases their level of effort as a result of an increase in the difference between perceived and actual income.
In order to examine this relationship empirically we use individual data from a sample of British academics from 5 old established universities. The British academic profession provides an interesting application for our analysis. The Hay report, published in 1997, suggested that over the ten-year period 1987-1996 university pay in Britain dropped a staggering 20% in real terms, falling behind the remuneration levels of comparable professions in the public sector. Dearing (1997) confirmed this trend, warning that although academic remuneration should be sufficient to recruit, retain and motivate staff of the required quality, the majority of staff in British higher education were in fact paid substantially below comparable private and public sector rates. Concern was that the long-term underpayment of academics might decrease productivity, and/or may spark the drain of high quality individuals from academia into more lucrative positions in the private sector, or to academic positions abroad.
An advantage of the study of this particular labour market is that productivity is relatively easy to observe and quantify. The emergence of the research assessment exercise 3 in Britain has emphasised the importance of publication to an academic career. Our dataset includes detailed information on individual research productivity, measured through the number of publications held by an individual. Our data also contains information on annual salary and on a measure of an academic's perceived or deserved salary. It has been suggested that academics as an occupational group may be less concerned about salary than the average worker, with non-pecuniary aspects of the job such as rewarding work taking precedence over salary. We consider the case that individuals derive utility from their job, over and above that derived from salary, during the course of our analysis. One might however wish to see the estimates derived from our empirical analysis as a lower bound estimate of the relationship between effort and reward.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces a theoretical model that investigates the relationship between the level of effort and the difference between the perceived and actual income of the worker. Section 3 introduces our dataset, summary statistics derived from our sample and discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
Our analysis focuses on the relationship between the effort invested by a worker at the work place and the difference between that worker's deserved income (that is the income that he or she thinks he/she deserves) and the actual income he/she receives. Since our empirical analysis is based on academic data, so we introduce our model in terms of publications and time invested in research activities and annual salary. Our theoretical and empirical results have however a more general application.
Each academic determines optimally how much time to spend in research activities, which may in turn yield publications in refereed journals. In order to simplify our story we assume that each academic has one unit of time, which he/she divides optimally between two alternatives: leisure and effort spent in research. Denote L the level of leisure and e the amount of effort invested in research activities, thus
Academics differ in their research abilities. In order to simplify our analysis we focus on a "representative" academic, who can be thought of as an "average" academic. We consider the number of publications the representative academic generates which is assumed to be a positive function of his/her time expenditure in research activities. Denote Pub(e) as the number of publications a representative academic produces, given e units of effort.
We consider a two period model. In the first period the academic earns an income of I 1 and must determine how much effort to invest in research activities. This effort will generate publications and as a result, with probability P the academic will be promoted and receive a higher income of I 2 in the second period ( I 2 > I 1 ). With probability 1-P the academic is not promoted and will earn the same income he received in the first period. The probability of promotion is a direct function of the number of average publications, thus the probability of promotion is also a positive function of the effort invested in research activities:
. It may be the case that an academic cannot be promoted in the future, since he/she may already hold a professorial position. Moreover, we could also think about promotion as the tenure hurdle -the probability of those that have tenure of receiving tenure is zero.
We simplify our analysis by assuming that the level of income is independent of the effort level. For the particular profession that we consider in our empirical section -that is British academia -this is a realistic assumption, since salaries within grades are based on a fixed salary structure and rise automatically in annual increments, irrespective of an individual's effort on the job. Allowing for the income, I, to be a function of the number of publications and thus also a function of the level of effort would however not change our main results 4 .
Let us now consider the utility of the representative academic, u. An individual's utility is a function of a number of parameters: first, it is positively related to an academic's leisure time, L;
second, it is positively related to an academic's actual income, I 1 ; it is positively related to the number of publications published (this assumes that an academic derives utility from his/her job over and above that associated with income 5 ); and, finally, it is negatively related to the difference between the income a worker thinks he/she should earn, I e , that is deserved income, and the actual income he/she receives, I. The difference between the income that he or she thinks he/she deserves, and the actual income that he/she actually receives is denoted by A= I e -I. 6 The representative academic's utility in the first period can therefore be written as follows:
( )
The academic's expected utility in the second period is given by:
We assume that the level of effort invested in the first period determines the number of publications published in the second. In the first period an academic therefore takes as given his income level, I 1 , the publications he/she held on entry to his/her current position (if any), Pub 1, and the difference between his perceived income and his actual income, A 1 . An academic then decides on his investment in research which may yield a promotion at the end of period 1, resulting in a higher income in the second period and a new difference between actual and deserved income, A 2 .
If the academic is not promoted, however, he will continue to earn I 1 while his deserved income will have risen, thus A 3 > A 1 . It is clear therefore that A 2 and A 3 are a function of the effort invested in the first period.
The expected utility of the representative academic over both periods is given by The academic's objective is therefore to determine the optimal amount of effort to invest in the first period. The first order conditions are given by 7 The LHS represents the marginal cost of the investment -the decrease in leisure resulting from an increase in effort invested in research. On the RHS we see the marginal benefit of investing effort in research,
represents the marginal probability times the increase in utility as a result of winning the promotion.
( ) represents the marginal effect of increasing effort on utility when not receiving promotion. The first term is the positive effect of an increase in publications while the second effect represents the negative effect of increasing effort and increasing the difference between deserved and actual income. The sum may be either negative or positive.
We denote the level of effort that satisfies (6) by e * . We are now interested in investigating what effect a change in A 1 has on individual productivity, measured by the effort/number of publications invested/produced by the representative academic. Thus we calculate: . .
(7)
It is assumed that i u exhibits decreasing returns to our various variables thus,
. Together with the natural assumptions regarding our first order derivatives we obtain:
Let us first consider the extreme case where the probability of promotion is very small or doesn't exist at all. This case will hold for all those academics that have tenure or do not believe that they will be promoted. Under this case ( )
The effect on leisure is negative while the effect on publication is positive and the effect of the difference between deserved and actual income is also negative. We therefore obtain,
Result 1: If the academic has a low or no probability of being promoted then:
If the academic is only (or mostly) concerned with publications (a "true" academic) he will increase his effort (if possible) in research activities.
If the academic is also concerned about his leisure and his/her deserved verses actual income, then the effect of an increase in A on the level of effort is ambiguous.
will still hold if we relax this assumption. This result states that if an academic cannot be promoted, but is only concerned about publication then he will invest all his time in publication. If, however, he is also concerned about the difference between his deserved and actual income and about his leisure time, then he may increase or decrease the time invested in research activities. Now let us turn to the case where an academic may be promoted. Notice that in comparison to the case where an academic will not be promoted (8) we now have to take into consideration one more element (7): the effect on the future utility if promoted: 
Note that
and given what we have described above, it is clear that 
. The sign of the term
is positive, since the effect of A when one has been promoted should be smaller than that when the person hasn't been promoted (remember that
and that the utility has a decreasing margin with regard to A). We have therefore added three new components to (8) which all are positive. We may conclude therefore that
Result 2: If the academic believes he/she may be promoted as a result of increasing his/her effort he/she will invest more time and effort in research activities than the academic, with the same attributes, that doesn't believe he/she will be promoted.
To conclude, from results 1 and 2 and the above analysis we hypothesise that an academic believing that he/she earns less than he/she deserves, may in turn (1) increase effort on the job in order to prove their worth for a promotion or, (2) decrease research activities in the face of insufficient pecuniary reward. An academics response may hinge critically on the probability of promotion. In other words, tenured academics will tend to publish less as the difference between the income they think they deserved and actual income increases. On the other hand, non-tenured academics may increase or decrease the effort invested in research activities as the difference between deserved and actual income increases.
In section 4 we turn to look at the empirical evidence on incentives effects on productivity in British academia. Section 3 first introduces the data source and it's main characteristics.
Data
The About what I deserve, (iv) Somewhat more than I deserve and (v) Much more than I deserve'.
The comparative disadvantage of the dataset is its' cross sectional nature. We are only able to analyse a snap-shot of the academic profession at one point in time without the ability to correct for selection in and out of the profession, nor are we able to observe the dynamic effects of underpayment on individual effort. This restriction is an important caveat to our analysis.
Nevertheless the analysis of the cross sectional picture introduces some interesting propositions, to be challenged by future research.
[TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE ] Table 1 presents the definitions of the explanatory variables used in our empirical analysis.
Of the 878 academics from whom information was collected, we select fulltime academics, those paid on the non-clinical scale and those academics that are under the age of 64. Dropping those cases with missing information, we are left with 689 observations. field in our analysis. One way to do this would be to estimate the research ouput by scientific field, but our relatively small number of observations does not favour such an approach. Instead we normalize the number of papers by subtracting means and dividing by standard errors by subject field. This also allows us to consider what it takes to publish more than the average in an academic's field. The last panel of table 2 presents statistics on academics' actual and perceived salaries. We see that the majority of academics report that they receive a lower salary than they feel they deserve (79%), a large proportion report that they receive much less than they deserve (18%). Colomns 2 to 6 break all statistics down by contract type (short term or tenured) and grade.
[TABLES 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE ] Interesting results to mention are that (1) we reveal a significant male advantage in publication output, (2) experience, tenure and holding a PhD are important predictors of publication success, and (3) hours of work are not significant in the determination of academic productivity.
The career path of the average academic entails two important hurdles -achieving tenurethat is acquiring a permanent position at an institution, and getting promoted from grade to grade.
The first interpretation of the extreme case of our model -that is that the probability of promotion is very small or doesn't exist at all -is the case when an individual is already tenured. Columns 2 and 3 of table 3 therefore split our sample into those academics with a tenured position and those on short-term contracts. From column 2 we now see that hours of work are a significant predictor of the productivity of tenured staff. In using the specification in equation (10) with cross sectional data one might be concerned about the direction of causality -underpayment may not be causing decrease in productivity, but rather low productivity may impact negatively on wage and hence on the difference between deserved and actual income. Without longitudinal data, we are unable to isolate the two effects. This split however allows us to consider a mixed bag of academics -the untenured, which will contain both talented academics and 'rejects', against a bag of talented tenured academics, hence, analysis of the latter group already conditions on a certain level productivity standard.
We are centrally concerned however with the possible disincentive effects of underpayment on individual productivity, more specifically the correlation between the productivity and the difference between the perceived and actual income. Columns 4 and 5 therefore include a dummy variable indicating those individuals that consider they deserve a higher salary than the currently receive (more), and those individuals that consider they deserve less (less). The base category here is those individuals that respond that they are paid about what they deserve. We see that the coefficient on perceived underpayment is significantly negative, for both tenured and short-term contract staff, this effect is only significant for tenured staff however 10 . Columns 6 and 7 now replace our more and less variables with more detailed information on the extent of any under or over payment that respondents perceive. We see that for tenured staff, the negative relationship between perceived underpayment and productivity increases in magnitude with the gap between 10 Note that with cross sectional data we cannot say anything concrete about the direction of causality of this relationship.
deserved and actual pay. Once again, this effect is only significant for tenured staff. Interestingly, when we run separate regressions for men and women (not reported here) this underpayment effect is found to only be significant for men.
Alternatively, a second interpretation of the extreme case of our model -that is that the probability of promotion is very small or doesn't exist at all -is the case when an individual already holds the position of professor. Combing grade information with information on tenure, we divide our sample into three groups, or grades, of academic. Grade 1 consists of researchers or lecturer A staff, who can be promoted to higher grades and are unlikely to hold tenured positions. Grade 2 consists of lecturer B staff, senior lecturers and readers, who are likely to hold tenured positions but can still be promoted, since they hold positions lower than the title of professor. Finally, Grade 3 consists of tenured professors 11 -those individuals who cannot be promoted along either of our two definitions.
[TABLES 5 ABOUT HERE ] Table 4 presents our analysis of the determinates of productivity for these three grades of staff. The first three columns of table 4 exclude variables relating to deserved salary. Interesting results include (1) the persistence of a significant gender effect in productivity for grade 1 and 2, but not grade 3 staff and (2) the significant effect of a PhD from Oxford or Cambridge for grade 3 staff.
Introduction of our more and less variables in columns 4 to 6 indicate the significantly positive relationship between being paid more than deserved for grade 1 staff and the significantly negative effect of underpayment for professors. Inclusion of our more detailed information on the extent of under and overpayment in columns 7 to 9 indicates that the magnitude of the negative relationship for professors increases with increasing distance between perceived and actual pay levels.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the disincentive effects of underpayment on individual productivity. We are interested in the relationship between the effort invested by a worker at the work place and the difference between the income that he or she thinks he/she deserves, and the income that he/she actually receives. In the first half of the paper we develop a theoretical model which suggests that an academic believing that he earns less than he deserves, may in turn (1) increase effort on the job in order to prove their worth for a promotion or, (2) decrease research activities in the face of insufficient pecuniary reward. We outline that an academics' response may hinge critically on the probability of promotion and /or increase in income. In other words, holding human capital characteristics constant, tenured academics will tend to publish less as the difference between the income they think they deserved and actual income increases. On the other hand, non-tenured academics may increase or decrease the effort invested in research activities as the difference between deserved and actual income increases. Our model predicts that if, however, tenured staff also derive utility directly from publication other than that associated with income and promotion, the difference between perceived and actual income will have a smaller effect on the actual effort invested in research.
In the second half of the paper we look at empirical evidence to support our theoretical analysis and find that taking promotion as a tenure hurdle, we reveal no evidence of any significant relationship of pay on performance for contract staff, where performance is measured in relation to the average in one's field. For tenured staff however, our analysis reveals a significantly negative relationship between underpayment and productivity. This effect increases with the magnitude of the distance between perceived and actual salary. The direction of the relationship between underpayment and productivity is confirmed when taking promotion as a combination of tenure and promotion hurdle. We find that professors are likely to be increasingly less productive, as they consider themselves progressively underpaid. We also find evidence that junior staff, however, experience accelerated productivity as they regard themselves generously rewarded.
Hence it appears that underpayment has limited effects on productivity for those individuals who still have promotion or tenure opportunities. Underpayment may be particularly damaging to individuals who hold tenure/the title of professor are unsuccessful in salary negotiation and are limited in their outside options. One might question therefore why such individuals remain in academia at all. The answer may lie in the fact that academics do what they are good at -publishing and gaining international recognition, rather than earning money! Length of time with current employer, measured in years Tenure Sq
Tenure Squared Small Department =1 if the respondent works in a department of 10 or less academic staff, =0 otherwise.
Medium-sized department =1 if the respondent works in a department of more than 10 but less than 40 academic staff, =0 otherwise.
Large Department
=1 if the respondent works in a department of 40 or more academic staff, =0 otherwise. = 1 if respondent replied 'Somewhat more than I deserve, = 0 otherwise. Much more than I deserve' = 1 if respondent replied 'Much more than I deserve', = 0 otherwise. Less = 1 if respondent replied 'Much less than I deserve' or 'somewhat less than I deserve' More = 1 if respondent replied 'Much more than I deserve' or 'somewhat more than I deserve'
Annual Salary
Gross annual salary of respondent 
Job position
Short-term contract .40 - - - - - Grade 1 .44 - - - - - Grade 2 .41 - - - - - Grade 3 .15 - - - - -
